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ABSTRACT
Current and expected job tenure have fallen significantly over the last two decades. Over the same
period, traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily
less common. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain
changes in pension structure and job tenure. In our model, a decline in the value of existing jobs
relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions. We show
that this explanation is consistent with observed trends and suggests an additional consequence of
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In the midst of the economic boom of the 1990s, the New York Times suggested that “the
notion of lifetime employment has come to seem as dated as soda jerks, or tail ﬁns” (Kolbert and
Clymer 1996).1 Most data sets show that job tenure, especially of male workers, has fallen over
the last two decades. Average tenure of male full-time employees in the Survey of Consumer
Finances fell almost 10%, from 9.7 to 8.8 years, between 1983 and 1998, and expected remaining
job tenure dropped more. Average tenure of female full-time employees rose and then fell,
suggesting that their rising attachment to the labor force was tempered by an overall decline in
tenure. Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage since the early 1980s.
Traditional deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less
common, while deﬁned contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread.
The link between job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it oﬀers
insights about both phenomena. Analyzing this link allows us to bridge key gaps in the literatures
on job stability and on the structure of compensation. First, we develop a matching model with
endogenous job destruction that can explain the use of deferred compensation contracts and their
connection to job duration. Earlier models of pensions typically did not incorporate uncertainty
about job duration, nor make explicit the nature of the worker’s outside option — both of which are
formulated in matching models and crucially aﬀect the value of tenure-based contracts. Earlier
models of job matching rarely incorporated the use of deferred compensation. Recent papers
have begun to analyze tenure-based contracts designed to deter on-the-job search;2 this paper
uses a model with a simpler form of moral hazard to highlight how changes in the economic
environment alter the feasibility of such contracts.
Second, we discuss what kinds of shifts in the stochastic productivity process can explain
observed trends in job tenure and pension structure. The model does not require a change
in the mean productivity of new matches. Instead, we focus on two less drastic possibilities:
1We have appropriated this quote, with thanks, from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999).
2Burdett and Coles (2003), Stevens (2004), and Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2003).
2(i) an increase in the frequency of shocks that reduce the value of existing matches relative to
new matches, or (ii) an increase in uncertainty about future productivity. Thus, the model
provides possible explanations for the observed decline in job tenure, while most recent research
has focused on documenting recent trends. It also oﬀers a new, endogenous explanation for the
decline in DB pensions that diﬀers from the focus of previous research on exogenous changes
in pension regulation. The reversal in emphasis here suggests the possibility that regulatory
changes responded to an underlying increase in the gains from worker mobility.
Third, we argue that new technologies appear to have reduced the value of existing jobs
relative to new jobs and, perhaps, raised uncertainty in the manner in which we hypothesize.
We demonstrate that observed patterns of technological change and their relationship to job
tenure, and pension structure support the empirical implications of the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss trends in job tenure and pension
structure. In Section 3, we review past research on the functions of DB pensions, which may
discourage moral hazard, motivate match-speciﬁc investment, and deter on-the-job search.
In Section 4, we develop a matching model and incorporate this notion of DB pensions. We
show that a contract that defers compensation conditional on tenure, mimicking a DB pension,
elicits optimal eﬀort. However, the contract may break down in the face of shocks to the output
process which make it riskier to get bound into a long-term relationship.
In Section 5, we present empirical analysis. Because comprehensive data is lacking, we do
not estimate our model. Instead, we show that there is a strong empirical relationship between
job tenure and pension structure; that the value of long-term jobs appears to have dropped; and
that higher rates of technological change in industries are associated with lower job tenure and
lower DB pension coverage.
In Section 6, we conclude by linking our results to other research on the nature of new
technologies. Many of the phenomena identiﬁed in earlier studies support our explanation
for a decline in the value of long-term jobs, and our study suggests a further consequence of
technological change that has not been closely studied.
32 Background
In this section, we set the stage by presenting trends in job tenure and pension structure and
discussing the structure of typical pensions. We also contend that, while pension regulation has
changed a great deal, it does not fully explain the observed trends in pension structure.
2.1 Trends in job tenure
We ﬁnd that both current and expected remaining job tenure fell in the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).3 Overall, total expected job duration fell signiﬁcantly by 10-20%, depending
on the time period and sample.4 Our theoretical and empirical analyses later on will draw links
between the contemporaneous declines in job tenure and DB pension coverage.5
2.1.1 Current job tenure
Average job tenure of male full-time employees aged 22-59 in the SCF fell from 9.2 years in 1983
to 8.6 years in 1998. Average tenure of female full-time employees rose from 7.2 years in 1983
to 7.9 years in 1992 and then fell back to 7.2 in 1998. Male job tenure fell across the board
by experience and education, and the declines were signiﬁcant for all but the most experienced
workers.
Table 1 shows average job tenure broken down by gender and years of potential experience.
Average tenure of men with 0-5 years of potential experience — those least likely to have DB
3The SCF began in 1983 and surveyed a new cross-section every three years, oﬀering the longest consistent
information on pension coverage and job tenure and the only source on expected job tenure. We omit data from
1986, which had an unusual sampling frame. The primary disadvantage is that industry and occupation codes
are highly aggregated (only 6-7 categories reported).
4Early research did not conﬁrm anecdotal reports of a decline in long-term jobs like the one cited in the
introduction (Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky 1997; Farber 1996). Since then, however, researchers have compiled
mounting evidence of a decline in male job tenure in most data sets (Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen 1999; BLS
2000; Jaeger and Stevens 1999; Bernhardt, et. al., 1999) except the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(Gottschalk and Moﬃtt 1999). None of these earlier papers used the SCF.
5Whether the decline in tenure is dominated by voluntary or involuntary mobility remains unclear. Our
model does not yield a meaningful distinction between them since all matches end endogenously. Moreover, it
is irrelevant for our primary contention (though not for welfare implications) that trends in job tenure and DB
pensions are linked; an increase in either voluntary or involuntary job exits would reduce the value of long-term
compensation arrangements.
4pensions — declined signiﬁcantly from 2.8 years in 1983 to 1.7 years in 1998. Average tenure of
those with 6-15 and 16-25 years of potential experience declined signiﬁc a n t l yf r o m4 . 9t o4 . 4y e a r s
and from 9.9 to 8.6 years, respectively. In results that are not shown, tenure fell for workers
who attended college as well as those who did not.
Changes in job tenure among women apparently reﬂect a combination of increases in labor
force attachment early on and secular declines in job tenure later.6 Tenure rose and then
fell a little for those with 16 or more years of potential experience, while it tended to remain
steady early on and then fell more (and statistically signiﬁcantly) for those with less potential
experience.
2.1.2 Expected job tenure
The SCF also asked how long respondents expected to continue working for their current employer
— yielding a measure of expected job duration that is a key element of the model we present
later. Expected tenure is noisier than actual tenure, especially for the smallest group of least
experienced workers. Nevertheless, the series show generally signiﬁcant declines as well, so the
drop in current tenure in Table 1 reﬂects more than a one-time reshuﬄing of workers into new
jobs. Declines are observed across the board by gender and experience over the entire period
from 1983 to 1998, and also from 1992 to 1998 when the questions were consistent across years.7
Among full-time employees aged 21-59, expected remaining tenure fell signiﬁcantly for men
from 18.0 in 1983 to 15.9 in 1992 and 14.1 in 1998 and for women from 15.3 in 1983 to 13.6 in
1992 and 12.2 in 1998. Table 2 shows expected remaining job tenure by gender and years in the
labor market. Among men, expected tenure fell most for those with the least experience. For
example, for those with 6-15 years of current tenure, expected remaining tenure fell signiﬁcantly
from 22.6 years in 1983 to 19.6 in 1992 to 16.9 in 1998. It fell by less for men with current tenure
6We will focus more on men, as other papers on job tenure tend to. Absent major supply side changes, their
trends reveal more about changes rooted in labor demand.
7The decline in expected job tenure cannot be attributed to earlier retirement plans. Both the expected
retirement age and the proportion who said they would never stop working remained roughly ﬂat over much of
the period, and if anything increased in 1998.
5of over 15 years of tenure, and their declines between 1992 and 1998 were not signiﬁcant. Again,
changes in expected remaining job tenure among women reﬂect rising labor supply combined
with declining job tenure. For both men and women, expected tenure declined more for the
more educated compared to the less educated.
Adding together current and expected remaining tenure yields an estimate of total expected
job duration. For men, total expected tenure fell from 27.2 years in 1983 to 24.4 years in 1992 (a
decline of 10.1%) and 22.7 years in 1998 (a further decline of 7.2%). For women, the total went
from 22.5 years in 1983 to 21.5 years in 1992 (a decline of 4.4%) and 19.3 years in 1998 (a further
decline of 10.1%). Thus, total expected job duration fell signiﬁcantly by 10-20%, depending on
the time period and sample.
2.2 Pension structure and trends
At the same time that job tenure declined, DB pensions became steadily less common. Among
full-time employees with a pension in the SCF, 69% had a deﬁned beneﬁt( D B )p l a na n d4 5 %
had a deﬁned contribution (DC) plan in 1983, while 40% had a DB plan and 80% had a DC
plan in 1998. Overall pension coverage also declined somewhat, from 67% of full-time employees
in 1983 to 58% in 1998, suggesting a general move away from deferred compensation. Later,
we show that the DB pensions that remain seem to have declined in value as well. In the rest
of this subsection, we show how the structure of DB pensions inﬂuences tenure, and we discuss
changes in pension regulations.
2.2.1 The structure of pensions
Deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n s . DB pensions oﬀer a deﬁned payout to workers after they leave an
employer. We can describe its value in terms of pension wealth Pt, the actuarially discounted
real present value of expected future pension beneﬁts if the job ends at year t.P e n s i o n w e a l t h
accrual is the discounted change in pension wealth 1
1+rPt+1−Pt if the worker stays one additional
year and then leaves.
6The path of DB pension wealth accrual is typically characterized by sharp spikes. While
the speciﬁc parameters of DB plans vary a great deal across employers, Figure 1 shows pension
wealth accrual in a particular DB plan in 1992.8 Spikes are generated at the vesting date and the
early and/or normal retirement dates, depending on the speciﬁc pension formula. Large spikes
discourage worker mobility for many years after a worker starts a job. Among older workers
with a pension in 1992, median pension wealth was about $200,000 if workers stay in their job
until age 65. Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988) estimated that the pension loss associated
with switching jobs for the average worker aged 35-54 is approximately half a year’s earnings.9
Deﬁned contribution pensions. Accumulated employer and mandatory employee contribu-
tions to DC plans are a form of deferred compensation.10 The accrual of DC pension wealth is
simple: contributions go into an account which earns a return, and the account is portable after
vesting, which is often immediate (Mitchell 1999). The resulting smooth path of DC pension
wealth accrual shown in Figure 1 is largely tenure-neutral and stands in stark contrast to DB
accrual.11
2.2.2 Regulation of pension plans
While employer-provided pensions were largely unregulated for many years, the government has
frequently altered and tightened pension regulations since 1974 (Clark and McDermed 1990).
Regulatory changes have set funding standards for DB pensions, extended tax incentives for DC
pensions, and constrained the structure of pensions in order to, for example, limit how much they
8Plan data was obtained from employers of respondents in the Health and Retirement Survey and has been
slightly altered, as described in Friedberg and Webb (forthcoming), to protect conﬁdentiality.
9Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) pointed out that pension wealth may, nevertheless, be quite small at the start
of a job. They argued that the primary eﬀect of DB pensions is to deter mobility of longer-tenure, rather than
new, workers. When we present our model later, we will discuss extensions involving investment in match-speciﬁc
capital which capture the importance of mobility incentives of longer-tenure workers.
10Employees are typically forbidden from withdrawing or borrowing against their plan balances (Mitchell 1999).
Voluntary contributions by employees do not constitute deferred compensation but confer tax beneﬁts that may
not be available for other forms of saving. The tax treatment of DB and DC plans is similar, however; contribu-
tions are tax-deductible, returns accumulate tax-free, and income is taxable.
11Other diﬀerences between DB and DC plans do not aﬀect mobility incentives (Friedberg and Owyang 2002a).
A recent development is the conversion of traditional DB plans to cash balance plans, hybrids that accrue pension
wealth like DC plans but are funded as DB plans. We face little concern about misclassifying cash balance plans
in our analysis because they were still uncommon at the end of our SCF sample period in 1998.
7can favor high-earning employees. Although researchers have suggested several ways in which
these regulatory changes have reduced the appeal of DB pensions, none of them appear to fully
explain observed trends in pension structure.
First, as pensions have become increasingly regulated, the costs of administering DB plans
increased. However, the cost of administering DC plans rose at similar rates for all but the
smallest plans (Ippolito 1995).12 Second, Clark and McDermed (1990) claimed that some of the
regulatory changes limited the extent to which DB plans can be designed as incentive contracts
o ft h et y p ew em o d e ll a t e r . 13 Nevertheless, DB pension wealth can still accrue highly nonlin-
early, as in the plan shown in Figure 1. Third, Ippolito (2001, 2003) argued that regulatory
changes involving reversion taxes allowed companies to escape their DB pension obligations more
easily than before, which undermined the conﬁdence of other workers and motivated the shift
to DC pensions. Coronado and Copeland (2003), however, found that only some of the recent
conversions which they examined may have been governed by such motives.14 Furthermore,
a countervailing eﬀect arises from stricter funding standards enacted since 1974, which should
increase the willingness of workers to accept DB pensions.
Moreover, a variety of evidence suggests that the evolution of pension structure has been
associated with structural shifts in the economy. A series of papers using administrative plan
data showed that workers have shifted from jobs that typically oﬀer DB plans to jobs that
typically oﬀer DC plans.15 In the SCF, we found that pension coverage did not shift uniformly
in all jobs but rather at varying rates by industry, occupation, and education level.16 Other
12Kruse (1995) concluded that rising costs might explain some but not all of the decline in DB pensions between
1980 and 1986. Note also that enhanced tax incentives can explain why DC pensions have spread but not why
DB pensions have disappeared, since a worker can (and many do) have both types of plans.
13Before ERISA established maximum vesting periods, for example, many DB pensions only vested at the
normal retirement date.
14Only about half of S&P 500 plans that they identiﬁed as converting from DB to cash balance during the
1990s were in a position to be inﬂuenced by reversion taxes. Moreover, a majority of the conversions involved
increased pension liabilities to existing workers and thus no appropriation of future pension wealth.
15Clark and McDermed (1990); Gustman and Steinmeier (1992); Ippolito (1995); Kruse (1995); Papke (1999).
According to the second and third papers, for example, the movement of workers across jobs explains half of the
shift in aggregate pension structure.
16 Using analysis-of-variance, year main eﬀects explain just under half (48%) of the over-time variation in DB
pension coverage — so half of the decline occurred uniformly across types of jobs. Year-industry interactions
explain 22%, indicating diﬀerent changes in DB pension coverage across diﬀerent industries; year-occupation
8papers have shown that changes in pension coverage have mirrored patterns of increasing earnings
inequality across skill groups (Bloom and Freeman 1992; Even and Macpherson 2000), another
trend which is often attributed to structural changes in the economy.
Various trends in pension characteristics suggest similar factors at work. First, DB pensions
are becoming less common in the SCF and DC pensions more common even in unionized and
government jobs where pension wealth is diﬃcult to appropriate, in contrast to Ippolito’s (2001,
2003) hypothesis. Second, if long-term matches remain valuable, then employers could include
tenure-based incentives in DC plans to a greater extent than they do. While around 85% of
DB plans have cliﬀ vesting at the maximum allowed period of ﬁve years, less than half of DC
plans do. Similarly, employer contributions are based on tenure in only about 10% of DC proﬁt-
sharing plans (Mitchell 1999). Lastly, in support of the hypothesis we outline later, Coronado
and Copeland (2003) found a signiﬁcant association between the conversions of DB plans to cash
balance plans and the degree of labor mobility in the associated industry.
Thus, numerous pieces of evidence indicate that regulatory changes fail to explain the entire
shift in pension structure. Our focus on endogenous explanations provides a complementary
perspective and even suggests that regulatory changes may have responsed to an underlying
increase in worker mobility.
3 Theories of DB Pensions
Past theoretical research analyzes various incentive eﬀects of DB pensions. The model we
develop later builds on the idea that DB plans are designed to encourage optimal eﬀort and
longer tenure.
DB pensions as incentive contracts. In a series of papers summarized in Lazear (1986), Lazear
developed models in which employers structure compensation to deter shirking by workers whose
interactions explain 13%, and year-education interactions explain 15%. We used survey weights and controlled
for age; employer size; union coverage; interactions of occupation with education and industry; and gender and
interactions with education, occupation, and industry. Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) described pension trends
within industries and occupations.
9eﬀo r tc a n n o tb eo b s e r v e dp e r f e c t l y . AD Bp e n s i o nm o t i v a t e se ﬀort by workers who do not want
to get ﬁred and lose their “bond”.17 We incorporate this motivation for pensions and deﬁne
explicitly the nature of uncertainty about job duration and of the worker’s outside option — key
elements determining the value of tenure-based contracts.
Lazear (1983) argued that DB pensions also function as severance pay to encourage eﬃcient
retirement in models with rising wage proﬁles, another element of an incentive contract. We
could extend our model to generate a rising wage proﬁle if we imposed restrictions on the extent
to which compensation could be deferred through the DB pension.18 We chose not to include
an explicit retirement motive, however, since our model generates an endogenous termination
date. There is little evidence that a change in retirement motives caused the shift in pension
structure, since pensions of older workers have changed much less than pensions of younger and
shorter-tenure workers. If anything, the move away from DB plans may have increased ﬁrms’
use of temporary early retirement inducements (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1990; Brown 2000).
Other possible motives for DB pensions. A na l t e r n a t i v et h e o r yi st h a tD Bp e n s i o n sa t t r a c t
more productive workers, rather than eliciting higher productivity after workers are hired (Vis-
cusi 1985; Ippolito 1994). Empirical tests of screening motives for DB pensions have run into
diﬃculties, however, in resolving identiﬁcation problems (Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993;
Even and Macpherson 1990). Moreover, an endogenous explanation for the shift in pension
structure in this class of models involves a decline in the value of screening. This seems implau-
sible given other labor market trends such as the growth in earnings inequality among workers
with similar skills, which has been interpreted as an increased return to unobserved ability that
should enhance the need to screen workers.
The observed link between unionization and DB pension coverage has led other researchers
17Related ideas appeared in Becker and Stigler (1974). Similarly, employers may oﬀer DB pensions in order
to recoup sunk costs of hiring, ﬁring, or job-speciﬁc investments; or to discourage on-the-job search by workers
seeking better oﬀers (Burdett and Coles 2003; Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair 2003; Stevens 2004).
18In Ippolito (1994), wage tilt is necessary when the DB pension is too small to deter a worker from quitting
after receiving an attractive outside option. Akerlof and Katz (1989) showed that, in the absence of up-front
performance bonds, a rising wage proﬁle is insuﬃcient to deter shirking early in the career; a pension can deter
shirking and is often cheaper to the ﬁrm than allowing shirking. Ippolito (1991) found, however, that wage tilt
had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on job tenure, while DB pensions did.
10to focus on theories of union bargaining.19 However, earlier research showed that the decline
in unionization does not explain a great deal of the shift in pension structure. Moreover, an
implication of the model we develop later is that a decline in a worker’s bargaining power has
an ambiguous eﬀect. It will make shirking more attractive and thus increase the value of the
pension contract, though at the extreme it destroys the pension contract entirely because the
contract can no longer deter shirking at all.
Motives for DC pensions. As the use of DB pensions has decreased, why have DC pensions
become more popular? Portable DC plans simply constrain the path of consumption, so it is
not obvious what explains their use. One possibility is that some DC pensions (though not
a large number) replicate incentive eﬀects of DB pensions through short vesting periods and
matching rates. Another possibility is that pensions have an additional purpose as a vehicle for
saving, either because individuals have trouble saving on their own or because the government
wishes to discourage moral hazard in the presence of social insurance. It is important to note
that savings-related motives, which may help explain the use of both DB and DC plans, do not
explain the tenure-related structure of DB pensions nor oﬀer an obvious explanation for the shift
i np e n s i o ns t r u c t u r ea n dd e c l i n ei nj o bt e n u r e .
4A M o d e l o f P e n s i o n s
We develop an incomplete-contracting job-matching model that incorporates insights about the
role of DB pensions. Matching models oﬀer a rich representation of the labor market and of
the eﬀects of uncertainty which is absent from earlier models of pensions. Many search and
matching models focus on the rate and duration of unemployment and feature exogenous job
destruction, while ours emphasizes the duration of employment and endogenous job destruction,
which motivates the use of pensions.
We ﬁrst present a Nash bargaining model with moral hazard which builds on den Haan,
19Freeman (1985) argued that unions give a stronger voice to older, less mobile workers who use pensions to
appropriate rents from younger workers with higher quit rates.
11Ramey, and Watson (2000, hereafter DRW).20 As in DRW, moral hazard induces endogenous
match destruction. We propose a pension-contract model that discourages moral hazard and
eliminates ineﬃcient match destruction, although we do not demonstrate that it is the only
contract that would do so. After presenting the pension model, we discuss changes in the
productivity process that would lead agents to abandon the pension contract.
4.1 The baseline model with moral hazard
The following model illustrates the ineﬃciency generated when unobservable eﬀort on the part
of the worker aﬀects future match productivity. While we specify a simple form of moral hazard
—l o we ﬀort today destroys the continuation value of the match — we will indicate how it stands
in for a richer model in which a worker decides whether to invest in match-speciﬁc capital that
keeps the output distribution from drifting down, while skill-speciﬁc technological shocks may
erode the stock of capital.
The matching market. A continuum of atomistic unemployed workers and ﬁrms who are
searching in the labor market in a given period meet each other with probability λ.21 The
matched worker and ﬁrm i get an output draw Yi,t and decide whether to produce. If they do
not produce, they return to the matching market next period. They decide to produce if the
output draw exceeds a threshold value R,r e ﬂecting the surplus from producing today and from
the option to get another output draw and produce in future periods.
Production. Output Y is drawn from a distribution F(y) which is the same for all new
matches.22 Thus, while agents are identical ex ante, matches are heterogeneous in their actual
production draws. In each period, agents decide whether to continue producing or rejoin the
20Valletta (1999) did not write down a model but discussed extensions to a similar model by Ramey and Watson
(1997) that could help explain the decline in job tenure. Ramey and Watson modeled bilateral shirking in a pure
contract-theoretic framework without search; Valletta discussed the impact of a breakdown in cooperation. Our
approach extends the severance contract which Ramey and Watson outlined to the search and matching model
employed in DRW.
21Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2003) explore the role of pension contracts when workers search on the job.
22At this point, we assume a stationary distribution of Y and suppress the time subscript; later, we discuss the
implications of nonstationarity.
12labor market and draw their outside options. If the match breaks up, the worker and ﬁrm receive
bw and bf from their contemporaneous outside option and expect φ
w and φ
f from re-entering the
matching pool. If they produce, the agents split the match surplus through Nash bargaining,
with shares θ going to the worker and 1 − θ to the ﬁrm.
In addition agents are subject to moral hazard; for simplicity, we limit consideration to moral
hazard by the worker. A worker who shirks gains xw this period but undermines future match
productivity and thus the continuation value g(R). W ea s s u m et h a ts h i r k i n gc a u s e sg(R) to go
to zero, so the match is severed.23







(φ + b)dF(y). (1)
The continuation value equals the discounted value of the match next period if output exceeds
the threshold value R, plus the discounted value of the outside option if output falls below R.












((1 − θ)(y + g(R) − φ − b))dF(y)+β(φ
f + b
f). (3)
These values depend on the probability of re-matching λ and subsequently drawing a satisfactory
level of output (exceeding the threshold R) or alternatively remaining in the matching pool for
another period.
Joint surplus from the match is deﬁned as the value of the match less the value of re-entering
the matching pool, Y + g(R) − φ, and gets split according to the worker’s bargaining share θ.
This means that we can deﬁne the wage paid to the worker each period as the worker’s portion
23Suppose that match productivity is a function of match-speciﬁc human capital which must be kept current
at a cost xw to the worker. When the worker fails to update her speciﬁc human capital, match productivity falls
enough to induce the ﬁrm to sever the match.
13of the surplus plus his outside option less his portion of the match continuation value. Under
Nash bargaining, this is equivalent to the worker’s share of output, so wt = θYt.
Incentives in the presence of moral hazard. When the agents produce, the value of the match
is Y +g(R), current output plus the continuation value. This depends on the threshold output
level R,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes
R + g(R)=φ +m a x {x
w,b}, (4)
where φ = φ
w + φ
f and b = bw + bf.A t Yt = R,a g e n t sa r ej u s ti n d i ﬀerent between continuing
or breaking up the match. If the moral hazard premium xw exceeds the outside beneﬁt b,t h e n
R rises by the diﬀerence, as we demonstrate below. The increase in R i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fm o r a l
hazard raises the expected value of the wage, which compensates the worker for forgoing the
moral hazard payment.
We illustrate the impact of moral hazard on sustainable matches in Figure 2. Y + g(R),
match output plus the continuation value, appears on the vertical axis; and φ + b,t h eo u t s i d e
option, appears on the horizontal axis. The Joint Productivity Threshold (Z) shows matches
in which the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ (current period proﬁt Y − w plus continuation value gf) exceeds its
total outside option, while the worker’s Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint shows matches in
which the worker’s payoﬀ (wage w plus continuation value gw) exceeds the value of shirking plus
t h ew o r k e r ’ so u t s i d eo p t i o n . I Cl i e sad i s t a n c eo fxw − b above Z, since moral hazard imposes
an additional requirement on current productivity to sustain the match. Matches below Z are
jointly unproductive and are destroyed. Matches above IC are productive enough that the
worker chooses high eﬀo r t . M a t c h e sb e t w e e nI Ca n dZa r eb r o k e nu p( o rn e v e rf o r m e d )b e c a u s e
w o r k e r sc h o o s el o we ﬀort even though the matches are jointly productive. xw >bcreates a wedge
between eﬃcient and sustainable matches that require extra productivity in order to overcome
shirking.
These scenarios are summarized in the following proposition.
14Proposition 1 Suppose that no steady-state displacements occur in the model without moral
hazard (i.e., Yt +g −φ−b>0). For any xw >band nondegenerate F(y) with ﬁnite support in
the model with moral hazard, the match is incentive compatible and thus is sustained if w+gw >
xw+φ
w+bw, while the probability of match dissolution due to incentive incompatibility is strictly
between zero and one.
The incentive compatibility condition presented in the proposition requires that the worker’s
payoﬀ (wage w plus continuation value gw) exceed the value of shirking plus the worker’s outside
option. The proposition further implies that even though matches are jointly productive, there
exists some values of Y for any xw such that the match is not incentive compatible.24
An example. Suppose that agents draw productivity Y from a standard uniform distribution.








where k =1− β(1 − λ)(1 − R).25 If xw >b , it drives up the minimum output RMH required
to sustain the match, changing the resulting values of g and φ. RMH exceeds the reservation
t h r e s h o l dc o m p u t e di nN a s hm o d e lw i t h o u tm o r a lh a z a r d ,
RN =




since higher productivity is required to deter the worker from shirking and sustain the match.26
24A formal proof of a similar proposition appears in DRW. They show that for output below the reservation
threshold, the derivative of R with respect to x is strictly positive. Thus, if no steady state dissolutions occur,
x c a nb er a i s e ds u c ht h a tR>0, so some matches that are dissolved in the MH model would not be dissolved in
the N model.
25The solution is obtained by jointly solving the expressions for reservation productivity R, the outside option
φ, and the continuation value g.
26To illustrate some comparative statics, a higher value of threshold output R raises the continuation value
g but also raises the value φ of re-entering the matching pool. R itself is a positive concave function of the
contemporaneous outside option b. Additionally, for high values of b, R increases in the discount rate β and
decreases in the probability of rematching λ.L a s t l y , RMH >R N because xw >band 0 <R<1.
15The impact of moral hazard. Given (4), the worker will shirk if the value of not shirking
and sustaining the match (the wage plus continuation value) is smaller than the payoﬀ from
shirking (the premium xwand outside option). A higher value of θ, the worker’s bargaining
power and consequent share of future match rents, reduces the incentive to shirk. A higher λ,
the probability of re-matching, raises the value of the outside option and hence the incentive
to shirk. As long as b<x w,t h e nah i g h e rb, the contemporaneous outside option, increases
the reservation threshold RMH but by less than it would increase RN. This is because match
surplus, and therefore the wage and continuation value, continue to be determined by b,b u tR
is now determined in part by xw as well, so b has a reduced eﬀect.
To understand the magnitude of the eﬃciency loss in response to some of these parameters, we
compare aggregate output in a given period t in the moral hazard model, ˜ YMH =
R ∞
RMH dF(y)=
1 − RMH, with aggregate output in the Nash model with no moral hazard, ˜ YN =
R ∞
RN dF(y)=
1 − RN. The productivity loss resulting from shirking is
Λ =





which is always non-negative since RN <R MH < 1.
Figure 3 plots the productivity loss Λ, shown on the vertical axis, as the shirk premium xw
and the outside option b vary, given other reasonable parameter values (λ =0 .3, β =0 .95,
θ =0 .5). Since output per period lies between 0 and 1, we analyze values of xw and b of the
same order of magnitude. As expected, the productivity loss increases with xw and b, since they
make shirking more attractive. The productivity loss ranges from 0 to 15% for b =0 .66 and xw
rising from 0.66 to 0.7, and it reaches as high as 50% when b and xw exceed 0.9.
4.2 The pension model
Matches in the moral hazard model are vulnerable to incentives that raise payoﬀst ot h ew o r k e r
today but destroy the future value of the match. This generates ineﬃcient outcomes by forcing
16the dissolution of matches that are jointly productive. Here, we show that a deferred payment
conditioned on match tenure — structured like a DB pension — can change the worker’s incentives.
T h ec o n t r a c ti n d u c e st h ew o r k e rt od e v o t ef u l le ﬀort and can be constructed to ensure that the
match yields the same positive net productivity as if there were no moral hazard, so matches are
eﬃcient.
The pension contract. Suppose that the ﬁrm and worker write a contract {w,W,T} with the
following elements:
• T h ew o r k e rc o l l e c t sw a g ew = w in each period when he is working and t<T.
• The worker collects W(T), a lump sum, if he is still employed at time T.
Without loss of generality, we will set w =0 , and we will discuss the choice of W and its
dependence on T later.27 We assume that the ﬁrm is prevented from breaking up the match if
Yt >R= RN and t<T(note that we are focusing on incentive compatible contracts that yield
t h es a m ej o i n t l yp r o d u c t i v em a t c h e st h a tw o u l da r i s eu n d e rN a s hb a r g a i n i n g ) . W ea l s oa s s u m e
that the match breaks up if Yt <R N,e v e ni ft<T .T h u s , t h e ﬁrm pays out W at time T as
long as Yt >R N each period until T. The assumption that ﬁrms are prohibited from severing
productive matches but allowed to sever unproductive matches rests on the observability of Yt
and RN. It is crucial, however; if a ﬁrm could not break up a match once a contract is in place,
the worker would have no incentive not to shirk. Therefore, we must appeal to reputation eﬀects
or age discrimination laws which make it more diﬃcult to ﬁre older workers systematically than
to lay oﬀ workers when output suﬀers. Along these lines, empirical evidence indicates that
obvious breach of deferred compensation contracts by employers is infrequent.28
The worker’s incentives. Under the pension contract, the worker’s continuation value gw
P
depend on the wage contract {w,W,T}. Again assuming w =0 , then at the outset
27Enforcement considerations or risk aversion (as in Burdett and Coles 2003) would aﬀect the actual tradeoﬀ
between w and W.
28Pontiﬀ, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990); Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1991); Petersen (1992); Gokhale,





We need to demonstrate several things about the worker’s incentives in order to prove that
the pension contract is feasible. First, if the worker accepts the contract in period 1,s h ew i l l
not sever the match later. The continuation value grows in later periods since the value is ﬁxed
but the worker discounts it less. Thus, by induction, she will not sever the match in any period
t>1 unless the productivity distribution shifts (which we have not allowed for yet) such that
the worker’s outside option grows relatively more valuable.
Next, we summarize in the following proposition both the worker’s incentive to shirk after
accepting the contract and also the worker’s incentive to accept the contract at the outset :
Proposition 2 Suppose that the worker’s payoﬀ to shirking is xw. Then, the worker will accept
the contract {w,W,T} as long as the shirk premium satisﬁes xw <g w
P +w−φ
w.S p e c i ﬁcally for
the case w =0 , if xw <g w
P − φ
w in each period, then the worker will choose high eﬀort.
Thus, the worker accepts the contract and does not shirk if the shirk premium is smaller
than the value of the contract less the value of the outside option. We can check to see under
what circumstances the pension contract satisﬁes the inequality. Substituting (6) for gw and
substituting for the value of φ
w




b(k − λ(1 − RN)) + λJ
(1 − β)k
(7)
for all t =1 ,2,...,T. As we mentioned above, the constraint is more to likely bind the lower is
t. As time passes, the worker gets closer to the pension payoﬀ and is less likely to shirk and risk
getting ﬁred.
Note that condition (7) determines the minimum W necessary to provide the worker with the
proper incentives to ensure the match is both incentive compatible and yields joint net positive
productivity. The actual choice of W could be modeled as depending on θ, the bargaining weight
18that determines the split of current-period surplus in the Nash model.29
Comparative statics. In order to understand how condition (7) governs feasible values of W
and T, we analyze the impact of the threshold level of output RN and then the fundamental
parameters that determine RN.( 7 ) i d e n t i ﬁes the highest sustainable shirk premium xw for a




N) and severance risk π =P r [ Yt <R N]=
R R
0 dF(y)=RN. These two quantities are in tension as the reservation threshold RN changes.
Higher RN reduces conditional output J and hence the value of re-entering the matching pool
by reducing the likelihood that a productive match is formed; this raises the sustainable shirk
premium for a given W. However, higher RN also raises the severance risk π,s ot h a ts t a y i n g
matched becomes more uncertain; this reduces the sustainable shirk premium. At low RN,
the eﬀect on J dominates the eﬀect on π, making the required pension payoﬀ W for a given
termination date T relatively insensitive to changes in RN.A s RN increases, π takes over and
small changes in the reservation threshold have increasing eﬀect on the sustainability of the
pension contract.
Figure 4 shows how the pension payment W that satisﬁes (7) is aﬀected by some of the
model’s fundamental parameters. It shows how the minimum W, expressed as a percentage
of the total expected value of the match at time T, changes as the shirk premium xw and the
vesting date T change, given other reasonable parameter values (λ =0 .3, β =0 .95, θ =0 .5,
b =0 .5). Again, since output per period lies between 0 and 1, we analyze values of xw of the
same order of magnitude.
It is apparent from Figure 4 that the promise of the future pension has a powerful eﬀect in
deterring moral hazard. Thus, raising the shirk premium from 0.5 to almost 1 has little eﬀect
on the minimum required W for a given T. Figure 4 also shows the tradeoﬀ between the term
of the pension and its payoﬀ; as noted above, an earlier termination date T allows for a lower







θyt+i|t − ¯ w
¤
. This is also the expected future discounted value of the match less each period’s
wage payment, where RN is the severance risk, yt+i|t = E [yt+i|Ωt],a n dΩt is the information available when the
contact is written.
19payment W,g i v e nxw.I f xw is 0.7, for example, a termination date of 25 periods requires a
pension worth at least 27% of total expected Nash ouput, while a termination date of 15 periods
requires a pension worth 10% of total output.
However, at suﬃciently high values of xw (approaching or exceeding 1, the maximum value
of per-period output) the pension contract is no longer viable. The only way to deter shirking is
to continue to increase W as xw rises, but this is only proﬁtable if the ﬁrm also extends T,w h i c h
raises the risk that the match will be severed before T is reached. At some point governed by
(7), the ﬁrm cannot oﬀer a high enough W to get the worker to accept the necessary increase in
T, even if the worker’s discount rate β gets very close to 1.
Summary. The contract {w,W,T} will be accepted by both agents and enhances eﬃciency
when xw satisﬁes (7). In the next subsection, we discuss how changes in the productivity process
aﬀect the pension contract.
4.3 Expected tenure and the productivity process
The previous subsection demonstrated how the DB pension (the lump-sum payoﬀ W at time T)
can resolve the ineﬃciency caused by moral hazard. In the model we laid out above, match
productivity does not drift, so the continuation value remains constant. The pension contract
will also be eﬀective if productivity drifts upward, boosting the continuation value over time. In
this section, we analyze the implications of other possibilities — downward drift that reduces the
productivity of existing matches relative to new matches, or an increase in uncertainty. Later
on, we discuss the corresponding technology shocks which we have in mind.
We deﬁne worker’s expected tenure as E(τ)= 1
1−R, and we consider changes in the stochastic
productivity process that reduce expected job tenure. If the decline is severe enough, it will
render the pension contract infeasible, since the worker is no longer willing to defer payment
because the risk of exogenous separation becomes too high.
Downward drift in the productivity of existing matches. Consider matches which are initially
jointly productive. Suppose now that output each period is drawn from successively less favorable
20probability distributions, so Ft+1(y) >F t(y). This implies a time-dependent continuation value
in which gt+1(R) <g t(R). The Nash bargaining model then implies an increasing reservation
productivity Rt+1 >R t, since conditional output J>0 for all y; only a higher draw will induce
agents to continue the match in the face of worsened long-term prospects.30
The resulting condition Rt+1 >R t has implications for job tenure. The severance risk
π =
R Rt
0 dFt(y) increases when either the distribution becomes less favorable or reservation
output rises. This lowers expected job tenure and thus the expected value of the pension, since
the probability that the match lasts until T declines. As we noted in the previous subsection,
this eﬀect will reduce the maximum sustainable shirk premium, and at some point the contract
breaks down. Put diﬀerently, as the likelihood of exogenous separation rises, the payoﬀ date
in the contract must get increasingly close to the initiation date for the worker to accept the
risk of exogenous separation. However, reducing T also reduces the nominal value W of the
pension which the employer is willing to oﬀer. At some point expected tenure E(τ) becomes
small enough that the worker will not accept the contract. Consequently, a decline in expected
tenure will reduce the number and value of feasible pension contracts.
Increased uncertainty in the productivity process. The productivity threshold R is unaﬀected
by a change in the variance of the productivity process. Hence, a mean-preserving spread in the
productivity distribution raises the probability that the match will fall below the cutoﬀ value
R at some future date, if R lies below the mean of the productivity distribution.31 Again, the
terminal date T must be reduced for workers to accept the pension, but that reduces the payment
W which ﬁrms are willing to oﬀer, undermining the value of the pension to workers.
Summary. The preceding discussion provides intuition about the breakdown of DB pen-
sions. Contracts that defer payment to the worker preserve jointly eﬃcient matches that would
ordinarily be severed in a standard Nash bargaining model. However, shifts in the stochastic
process that reduce expected productivity of existing matches make it increasingly unlikely that
30In the type of human capital model we have alluded to, these shocks can result from the introduction of a
new technology which erodes the value of existing skill-speciﬁc human capital.
31The implications of a mean-preserving spread are reversed if R lies above the mean, but that seems unlikely
as it implies that the mean output draw is insuﬃciently high to warrant forming or preserving a match.
21the pension contract can be sustained. A mean-preserving spread in the distribution of future
productivity draws that suﬃciently augments uncertainty about match duration has a similar
eﬀect.32
4.4 Government regulation in the pension model
While changes in the productivity process may undermine pension contracts, they may also be
undone by government regulation. If the government dislikes the outcome that some workers
suﬀer exogenous separation before they collect their pension, it may require that workers be
guaranteed their accrued pension wealth if matches end before T. This destroys the ﬁrm’s
ability to inﬂuence worker eﬀort.
We can evaluate the loss caused by rekindling the moral hazard problem using our earlier
deﬁnition Λ =
RMH−RN
1−RN of the eﬃciency loss arising from moral hazard in the absence of pensions.
Figure 3 showed how the eﬃciency loss Λ increases as the shirk premium xw and the outside
option b rise, given other reasonable parameter values. For values of xwand b around 0.5 (recall
that output draws are bounded between zero and one), the eﬃciency loss can reach 8%, while
f o rv a l u e sa r o u n d0 . 6 5t o0 . 7 ,i tc a nb et w i c ea sh i g h . T h u s ,o u rm o d e lp r e s e n t st h ep o l i c y m a k e r
with a choice between social eﬃciency versus improving temporarily the welfare of a fraction of
workers who experience bad luck by mandating portability of pensions.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence that supports the hypotheses we have presented. It
is diﬃcult to estimate our model directly, given the absence of linked employee-employer longitu-
dinal data or even employee longitudinal data with details about the structure of compensation.
The alternative is to test implications of the model that relate to pension structure and job
32One must consider other possible contracts at this point. Ramey and Watson (1997) showed that contracts
with severance payments or punishments can sustain matches in the eﬃcient but incentive-incompatible region.
However, such contracts are rarely observed, perhaps because they are not easily enforceable or yield socially
ineﬃcient litigation.
22tenure. There are several types of evidence from the SCF and the CPS that we bring to bear.33
First, we show that job tenure is related to pension structure. We ﬁnd that workers with
a DB pension and with more valuable DB pensions have longer tenure than workers with DC
pensions or workers with no pensions. Second, we show evidence that the value of long-term jobs
— as measured by the value of DB pensions and the “return to tenure” observed in wages — has
dropped. This supports our explanation for the decline in job tenure and DB pensions. Third,
we present evidence that links technological progress to both the structure of compensation
and the decline in long-term jobs. Higher rates of computer use and overall investment across
industries are associated with lower rates of DB pension coverage and lower job tenure, and
these relationships were more negative in the 1990s than in the 1980s. If, instead, government
regulation induced the shift in pension structure, there would be no reason to expect such links.
5.1 Pension structure and job tenure
We show that workers with DB pensions have longer current and expected total job tenure than
both workers without pensions (as in Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993) and workers with DC
pensions (in contrast to Gustman and Steinmeier 1993). We also ﬁnd that workers with more
valuable DB pensions have longer tenure, controlling for earnings, with the value explaining
much of the diﬀerential eﬀect on tenure of having a DB pension. However, we do not estimate
a structural model of compensation and mobility, so our approach does not distinguish whether
DB pensions cause longer tenure.34
Regressing job tenure on pension type. We ran several regressions, separately for men and
33We noted earlier the reasons we concentrate on tenure and pension information from repeated SCFs. We
also use tenure information from repeated CPSs, which have larger samples and detailed industry and occupation
data, and we use some data from the April 1993 CPS, the last time questions were asked about pensions. The
notes to each table describe the sample, deﬁnition of variables, and estimation details. When using SCF data in
this section, all coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors are computed from regressions run on multiple implicates
(Rubin 1987).
34As noted earlier, we were unconvinced by previous attempts to estimate endogenous selection into DB pen-
sions. While including earnings on the right-hand side in our regressions is just one possible source of endogeneity,
it furthers our goal of describing the empirical relationship between tenure and the structure of compensation,
while controlling for the level.
23women, using both the SCF and the last pension supplement of the CPS.35 In the SCF results
s h o w ni nT a b l e3 ,m a l ew o r k e r sw i t haD Bp e n s i o nh a v eb e e ni nt h e i rj o b sa b o u t5y e a r sl o n g e r
than workers without a pension, depending on the speciﬁcation. Female workers with a DB
pension have been in their jobs about 4 years longer. Workers with both a DB and DC pension
have been in their job about half a year longer than workers with only a DB pension, but the
diﬀerence is generally not statistically signiﬁcant. In comparison, workers with a DC pension
have been in their job 2-3 years longer than workers without a pension, signiﬁcantly shorter than
workers with a DB pension. It is unclear ap r i o r iwhether to control for job characteristics such
as industry and occupation which may explain both pension structure and job tenure; including
such controls in the second and fourth columns reduces the estimated eﬀect of pensions on tenure
by a year or less.
It is important to point out that the relationship between pensions and job tenure does
not reﬂect a spurious correlation between two trending variables, since it remains strong when
year eﬀects are included in the third and fourth columns. Moreover, it persists if we interact
pension type with year, in results that are not shown.36 Since these eﬀects remain strong,
we can conclude that the same jobs are experiencing a decline in DB pension coverage and in
duration. Without ascribing a structural interpretation, we can understand the magnitude of
the estimated eﬀect by noting that the observed decline in DB pension coverage between 1983
and 1998 is associated with a decline in job tenure of 0.9 years for males and 0.6 years for females,
according to regressions (4) and (8); this is the same order of magnitude as the observed decline
in tenure.
We obtained similar, statistically signiﬁcant results in additional regressions that are not
shown here. We tried using total expected job duration (the sum of current and expected future
35We run tenure regressions separately because men and women exhibited diﬀerent secular trends, as noted
earlier. If we had such data we could run regressions on the job exit hazard rather than on current tenure, which
represents incomplete spells. The mean of complete and incomplete job spells will be the same if spell length is
not duration dependent. If it is, then a linear regression on tenure can be viewed as a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion
of more complicated speciﬁcations (Freeman 1980). We obtained similar results from regressions on the log of
tenure (Even and Macpherson 1996).
36The estimated response to DB pensions remained signiﬁcantly higher than the response to DC pensions while
declining by about 1-2 years by 1998, compared to 1983.
24tenure) as the left-hand side variable. Workers with a DB pension have total expected tenure
that is 5.5-7.5 years longer than workers without a pension, while workers with a DC pension
have total expected tenure that is 3.5-4.5 years longer. We estimated almost the same eﬀect
o fp e n s i o ns t r u c t u r eo nj o bt e n u r ei nt h eA p r i l1 9 9 3C P S . M o r e o v e r ,w h e nw er e p l i c a t et h e
speciﬁcations in (2) and (6) of Table 3 with detailed industry and occupation codes, tenure of
both male and female workers with a DB pension continues to be about 4 years longer than
workers without a pension, versus around 2.5 years for DC pension.37
Regressing job tenure on the value of DB pensions. We used SCF data to compute the
value of DB pensions and added that information to regressions like those reported in Table 3.
In some regressions, we included information which individuals with DB pensions report about
the pension beneﬁt which they expect to receive if they stay in their job as long as intended.
Because that is endogenous with expected tenure and reported with error, in other regressions we
included the average beneﬁt imputed on the basis of earnings, industry, occupation, education,
unionization, employer size, and gender.38
We ﬁnd several interesting results, which are shown in Table 4. First, a higher value of one’s
DB pension at retirement is associated with signiﬁcantly longer tenure. The semi-elasticity of
tenure with respect to the monthly pension beneﬁt (the statistic reported by most of the post-
1983 sample) is 0.5-0.6 when self-reported information is included (in regressions labeled a) and
0.25-0.4 when the average beneﬁt is included (in regressions labeled b). This implies, for a male
with the median value of expected future pension beneﬁts ($883 per month in 1998 dollars), that
job tenure is 3.5 years longer than it is for someone without a DB pension, according to (4a);
that is half a year longer than someone with the 25th percentile value ($351) and almost a year
shorter than someone with the 75th percentile value ($1867). For a female with the median value
($541), job tenure is 3.8 years longer than it is for someone without a DB pension, according to
speciﬁcation (8a).39
37These coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Friedberg and Owyang (2002b).
38This is similar to the approach in Gustman and Steimeier (1993), described below, of including an imputed
measure of pension backloading.
39The numbering of the regressions in Table 4 parallels the numbering of the regressions in Table 3. When we
25Second, once we control for DB pension value, then the additional eﬀect of having a DB
pension shrinks. It lies in a range between 0.5-3.5 years (versus 4-5 years in Table 3), in some
cases not statistically distinguishable from zero and in others not statistically distinguishable
from the eﬀect of DC pensions, which remains in the range of 2-3 years. Together, these
two ﬁndings support our hypothesis that DB pensions are used to extend job tenure, since the
diﬀerential eﬀect of DB pensions on tenure is operating through the value of the pension.
Third, the semi-elasticity of tenure with respect to earnings is somewhat larger (in the range
of 1.5-2.5 years) than the semi-elasticity with respect to pension value. This contradicts results
in Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) that they characterized as anomalous. We will discuss their
results in greater detail next.
Comparison to other results. The results in the regressions described above, duplicated in
two data sets, diﬀer importantly from Gustman and Steinmeier (1993). Unlike us, they found
similar mobility rates for workers with DB and DC pensions. Their econometric analysis was
similar, but they used the SIPP and included some diﬀerent variables. The SIPP is a panel,
which allowed them to focus on mobility rather than tenure.40 However, they only used data
from 1984-85, before DC plans became common. Also, in their words, “the SIPP question
sequence on plan type is atypical” (p.303) and overstated the prevalence of DC plans. Their
r e s u l t sm a yt h e r e f o r ed i ﬀer because of the time period or the measurement of job mobility and
pension structure.
Another diﬀerence was their inclusion of an imputed, selection-adjusted measure of the com-
pensation available in alternative jobs on the right-hand side of their mobility equation. Those
results suggested that pensioned workers faced worse alternatives relative to their current job
than did non-pensioned workers and that the compensation diﬀerential had a greater eﬀect than
pension wealth in deterring mobility. This is an important ﬁnding, but it hinges on knowing the
terms of alternative jobs available to workers who move selectively. No motivation was oﬀered
use total expected tenure on the left-hand side, the estimated semi-elasticities are about twice as large.
40The reliability of job mobility data in the SIPP is unclear, since, as we mentioned earlier, it does not show
the decline in job tenure which is apparent in other surveys.
26for the identifying exclusion restrictions used in imputing alternative compensation.41 Con-
sequently, in our view, the evidence that the alternative compensation premium, rather than
the structure of DB pensions, explains the pension-mobility relationship is not convincing. We
have reached this conclusion because we ﬁnd a robust relationship between pension structure
and mobility, which contrasts with their estimates even before they controlled for alternative
compensation, and because of the diﬃculties of measuring alternative compensation.
5.2 The value of long-term jobs to workers
While we do not have data to estimate changes in the value of a long-term job, we have some
evidence about the value to workers. We show two ways in which tenure-related compensation
may have shrunk: DB pensions appear to have lost value, and the degree to which earnings rise
with tenure has fallen. Balan (2003) also found evidence of the latter using diﬀerent data.
The value of DB pensions. As described above, from 1989 on the SCF reports the beneﬁt
people expect to receive when they leave the ﬁrm. In order to detect changes over time, we
regress this variable on year dummies. However, the expected pension beneﬁt depends not only
on the degree to which a DB pension defers compensation but also on the worker’s expected
tenure. In order to isolate the ﬁrst component, we include detailed controls for current and
expected remaining job tenure in the regressions. We also control for current earnings, in
case overall compensation declined, and in some cases we control for other individual and job
characteristics to isolate shifts in the terms of particular jobs, rather than in the composition of
jobs.
W i t ht h ec a v e a tt h a ti tm a yt os o m ee x t e n tr e ﬂect changes in tenure, the regressions in Table
5 show that DB pensions declined signiﬁcantly in value between 1989 and 1998. For the average
male with a DB pension, according to the results in speciﬁcation (2), the expected monthly
beneﬁt declined by $46 between 1989 and 1992, by $179 between 1992 and 1995, and by $69
41Age, marital status, children under 18, and home ownership were included in the mobility equation but
excluded from the current and alternative compensation equations.
27between 1995 and 1998. The overall drop of $295 represented an 18% decline below the average
monthly beneﬁt in 1989 of $1648 (measured in 1998 dollars) and is statistically signiﬁcant at the
90% conﬁdence level. Among females, according to speciﬁcation (4), the trend tended to be
negative but was not monotonic, since the expected monthly beneﬁt fell $322 in 1992, rose $256
in 1995, and then fell $191 in 1998. The overall decline of $258, or 26% below the 1989 value
of $998, is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level. These results suggest that DB pensions are
smaller than it used to be.42
The relationship between tenure and earnings. A common practice in the labor literature is
to estimate a “return to tenure”, with current earnings on the left-hand side and tenure and other
measures of human capital on the right.43 If the tenure premium has fallen, it suggests that
long-term jobs have become less valuable. Farber (1999) described the problem of interpreting
such estimates, since many theories (including ours) predict that compensation is structured
to inﬂuence tenure. As he argued, such estimates are interesting, nonetheless, in revealing the
structure of compensation, and later on we interpret the results in light of ours and other possible
models. We used data from CPSs between 1983 and 2000, which oﬀe rl a r g es a m p l es i z e s . 44 We
estimated log earnings equations for men and women separately and included quartics in tenure
for each CPS year.
Table 6 shows the earnings premium paid to the average male and female worker with 5, 10,
15, 20, and 25 years of tenure, compared to a worker beginning a job. The results oﬀer some,
though not complete, support for our claim that the value of long-term jobs declined. After
a mild increase that was not statistically signiﬁcant in the 1980s, the tenure premium declined
sharply, beginning in the early 1990s for men and the middle 1990s for women. For example,
42We also veriﬁed, based on the estimates in Table 5, that the decline in the value of DB pensions, if it occurred
for exogenous reasons, was not nearly large enough to cause the overall decline in job tenure.
43While our model does not feature a rising wage proﬁle, we alluded earlier to extensions in which a rising wage
is part of an incentive contract to lengthen job duration.
44We do not use earlier earlier tenure supplements because the wording changed. We adjusted the reported
tenure data for half-year rounding among those with 1-2 years of tenure, though in a simpler way than did
Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1997). We did not adjust the data for heaping at ﬁve-year intervals, as they did;
in their 1996 paper, they showed that adjustments for rounding and heaping did not aﬀect conclusions about the
magnitude of job tenure trends. When we tried adjusting the sampling weights, as they did, for diﬀerences in
nonresponse to the tenure question by age, sex, and race, the results were virtually identical.
28the earnings premium enjoyed by males with 10 years of tenure rose from 20.4% in 1983 to 24.7%
in 1991 and then dropped to 16.5% in 2000. The overall decline between 1983 and 2000 was
statistically signiﬁcant, and it fell the most for males with 10-15 years of tenure.45
For females, the drop-oﬀ occurred a little later but was sharper, so that the premium at each
year of tenure shown in Table 6 was signiﬁcantly lower in 2000 than in 1983. For example, for
females with 10 years of tenure, the earnings premium rose from 25.5% in 1983 to 28.5% in 1996
and then fell to 14.6% in 2000.
Balan (2003) also found a decline in the tenure premium that occurred earlier for both men
and women in the PSID. Using the panel data to instrument for job tenure, he estimated a
signiﬁcant drop of roughly 3/4 of a percentage point per year between 1981 and 1992 among
private-sector non-unionized male workers, with a slightly greater decline for recent job market
compared to older workers.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that the tenure premium dropped in industries with declining tenure,
supporting the idea that these trends are linked. We regressed the median real tenure premium
on average job tenure in the same industry and found that a one-year decline in average job
tenure is associated with a signiﬁcant 2.7 percentage point decline in the tenure premium (which
has a median value of roughly 18%).46
Interpretation. Our results show that both DB pensions and the earnings premium associated
with longer tenure appear to have shrunk in value. What can we infer from this evidence about
the value of long-term jobs? We control for the level of current earnings, so these changes are
not a consequence of an overall reduction or redistribution of match surplus. In the context of
our model, the evidence demonstrates that something related speciﬁcally to the duration of the
job changed.
45The F-statistic testing whether tenure was jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in 2000 than in 1983 at all of the
ﬁve-year age intervals shown in Table 6 had a p-value above 97%. As a point of reference, Topel (1991) estimated
that the earnings premium for males with 10 years of tenure was over 25%.
46We computed tenure premia and average job tenure in 45 two-digit industries that employed at least 100
people in each CPS survey. The regressions are weighted by the number of people from the CPS in each cell. If
we control for year and industry eﬀects (accounting for economy-wide changes and industry-speciﬁc values of the
tenure premium), then the correlation is greater, with a on e - y e a rd e c l i n ei na v e r a g ej o bt e n u r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ha
3.7 percentage point decline in the tenure premium.
29Our discussion of the pension contract illustrated the tradeoﬀ b e t w e e nt h et e r ma n dt h ev a l u e
of the DB pension — as the likelihood of exogenous separation increases, the worker demands a
pension that pays oﬀ s o o n e r ,b u tt h es i z eo ft h ep e n s i o nt h a tt h eﬁrm is willing to oﬀer falls and
at the limit the viability of pensions is threatened. Thus, a decline in the value of remaining DB
pensions supports our hypothesis that the value of long-term jobs fell. If, in contrast, increased
regulation explained the shift away from DB pensions, it is not clear why it would also reduce
the value of remaining DB pensions.
The literature oﬀers a number of explanations for observing a tenure premium. In the
context of those explanations, the inferences we can draw from a declining tenure premium are
generally consistent with our main arguments. Obviously, if the tenure premium is a component
of a tenure-based incentive contract, then a decline implies that the motivation to use long-
term contracts has diminished. Another possible explanation for a tenure premium is selective
mobility, so that the observed wage rises with tenure because workers in better jobs stay in
them longer. Selective mobility is an outcome of our model — matches end selectively when
their productivity draw falls below a reservation level — and it may result in a tenure premium if
match productivity drifts upward. A shift in the productivity process that undermines the value
of existing relative to new matches would lead to more mobility and an ambiguous eﬀect on the
observed tenure premium. A ﬁnal explanation for observing a tenure premium is that workers
are paid their marginal product and match-speciﬁc productivity rises with tenure, and a decline
in productivity of long-tenured workers causes a decline in the tenure premium. In sum, under
various models of wage formation a decline in the tenure premium can be explained by a decline
in the productivity of long-term matches.
5.3 Technological change, pension structure, and job tenure
We have shown that both actual and expected job tenure fell and that deferred compensation
shrank, from which we infer that the value of long-term jobs declined. In our model, this will
occur if there is an acceleration of shocks that erode the productivity of existing matches relative
30to new matches, or simply an increase in uncertainty about future productivity. We hypothesize
that a shift in the nature of new technologies has had such eﬀects.
As above, and in research by others, there is no data to test directly the eﬀect of new
technologies. Instead, we demonstrate that some commonly used measures of technological
change are negatively related to both DB pension coverage and job tenure, as we hypothesize.
We use data on computer use in jobs, which captures the diﬀusion of the major new technology
of the last 25 years.47 We also use data on investment, the capital stock, and total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, standard measures of both embodied and neutral technological used
in the macroeconomics literature.48 We use industry-level data on these measures and match
them to industry averages of job tenure and pension structure from the April 1993 CPS (with
results shown in Table 7) and with industry averages of job tenure from repeated CPSs (results
shown in Table 8).49 As above, we include average earnings in the regressions in order to reveal
changes in the structure of compensation while controlling for the level.
Technological change and pension structure in industries. The only data source reporting both
p e n s i o ns t r u c t u r ea n de a r n i n g si nd e t a i l e di n d u s t r i e si st h eA p r i l1 9 9 3C P S . W er e g r e s sa v e r a g e
DB pension coverage by industry on measures of technological change and report the results in
Table 7. We ﬁnd that computer use has a negative, sometimes signiﬁcant relationship with
DB pension coverage, and that TFP growth, investment, and capital have signiﬁcant negative
relationships. Based on the most detailed speciﬁcation in column (3), an industry with a one
standard deviation higher rate of computer use has a 3.7 percentage point lower rate of DB
pension coverage, which amounts to 7.6% of the mean.50 Based on the speciﬁcation in (4), an
47In October 1984, 1989, 1993, 1997, and September 2001, the CPS asked individuals whether they used a
computer at work. We compute average computer use in 50 industries in each CPS. In 2001, we also count as
computer users those who reported that they had a home computer and used it for work.
48We use investment, capital, and TFP data from the Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, which covers
21 disaggregated manufacturing sectors and 14 not-so-disaggregated non-manufacturing sectors annually from
1959 to 1996. While we average the data over 10-year periods, we obtained generally similar estimates using
averages over 5 years.
49These were among the measures used by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Bartel and Sicherman (1999)
to determine the impact of technological change on workers. We did not think it useful to try to match the
measures of technological change to SCF data, since SCF industry codes are so highly aggregated.
50Computer use is signiﬁcant in (3), when measures of past and future changes in computer use are also included,
though they are highly insigniﬁcant. In all speciﬁcations, we control for log average earnings and average health
31industry with a one standard deviation higher rate of TFP growth (investment) has a 3.7 (3.3)
percentage point lower rate of DB pension coverage.51 The magnitudes of these relationships
are quite similar across all the measures of technological change.
Technological change and job tenure in industries. Table 7 also reports the relationship
between job tenure in the April 1993 CPS and measures of technological change. Computer
use, investment, and the capital stock all have a signiﬁcant negative relationship with job tenure.
B a s e do na n yo ft h es p e c i ﬁcations in (6)-(8), a one standard deviation higher rate of computer
use is associated with about 0.75 years less in average job tenure, or 9% of the overall average.52
Based on the speciﬁcation in (9), a one standard deviation higher level of investment is associated
with about 0.5 years less in average job tenure.53
We also use repeated CPS job tenure supplements to explore the relationship over time with
these measures of technological change, as shown in Table 8. Computer use has a negative,
signiﬁcant relationship with job tenure in speciﬁcations (1) and (3); however, it shrinks a little
and loses signiﬁcance when controlling for year eﬀe c t si nj o bt e n u r ei n( 2 )a n d( 4 ) ,a n dt h e
estimate is smaller than it was in the April 1993 regressions. Investment and the capital stock
also have a negative and signiﬁcant association with job tenure in (7) and (9); the coeﬃcients
only decline slightly when year eﬀects are included in (8) and (10), and they remain a little larger
than the estimate in the April 1993 regressions.
While the evidence is weaker when we include year eﬀects, we ﬁnd that these relationships
strengthened over time. All the relevant coeﬃcients are smaller and/or more negative when we
include year eﬀects but limit the time period to the 1990s. Comparing (5) and (6), computer
u s eh a san e g a t i v eb u ti n s i g n i ﬁcant relationship with job tenure before 1990 and a more negative
and now signiﬁcant relationship after 1990. Similarly comparing (11) and (12), the relationship
between investment and job tenure becomes more negative and signiﬁcant after 1990, while the
insurance coverage (as measures of the level of compensation) and weight the regression by the number of workers
in each industry (so that the results reﬂect economywide averages).
51When investment and the capital stock are both included, they are jointly but not individually signiﬁcant.
We obtain similar results when we replace the level of investment with the investment-capital ratio.
52Past or fugure changes in computer use do not have additional eﬀects on job tenure.
53TFP growth has a positive but highly insignﬁcant relationship with job tenure.
32positive eﬀect of TFP growth on job tenure disappears.
Summary. We ﬁnd a consistent negative relationship between measures of technological
change and industry-level averages of DB pension coverage and job tenure. As far as we know,
results like these have not appeared in past research, and they support our claim that the nature
of new technologies has changed in ways that undermines the value of long-term jobs.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have speciﬁed a model of DB pensions and job tenure. DB pensions eliminate
ineﬃcient job destruction resulting from moral hazard; in more complex models, the moral hazard
can take the form of searching on-the-job or failing to invest in job-speciﬁc capital. The use of
DB pensions is undermined, however, if expected job tenure declines. We have shown in this
paper that both actual and expected job tenure have fallen along with the use of DB pensions.
We also used the model to demonstrate the types of changes in the stochastic productivity
process which reduce expected job tenure and hence the use of DB pensions. We focused on
shocks that increase uncertainty about future match productivity and showed, moreover, that
industries with more rapid rates of technological change have also experienced greater declines
in job tenure.
These results complement a large body of research analyzing the shifting nature and pace of
technological changes. Much of this research suggests that they have had the eﬀects on jobs
that we have in mind. The diﬀusion of new, especially information-related, technologies appears
to have had a powerful eﬀect on the level of compensation, raising earnings inequality along
a variety of dimensions (Gottschalk 1997, Acemoglu 2002). Inequality in pension and health
i n s u r a n c ec o v e r a g eh a sj u m p e do v e rt h es a m ep e r i o d .
The key reason for rising inequality, according to this literature, is that new technologies are
largely skill and ability-biased (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Case study evidence suggests
that new technologies require not just greater but also new skills. Computer use is, obviously, one
33of the new skills; employers and individuals continue to devote substantial resources to computer
training, even while computers have grown easier to use over time.54 Besides that, computers
have automated routine tasks while altering and often making more complex the performance of
non-routine tasks (Levy and Murnane 1996, Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002). Computerization
has brought on further changes in required skills, workplace organization, and the delivery of
services (Bresnahan, Brynjolﬀson, and Hitt 2002).
Our results add to this literature by suggesting additional consequences of the diﬀusion of
new technologies. We ﬁnd evidence that jobs have been reorganized in ways that loosen the ties
of long-term relationships between workers and ﬁrms.
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Table 1:  Current job tenure 
 Men  Women 
  Average, by years of potential experience 
  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35 
1983   2.8  4.9   9.9  14.2   2.3   4.9   7.7    9.9 
1989   2.2  4.8   8.9  14.7   1.9   4.0   7.6  10.5 
1992   2.3  4.8   8.1  14.1   2.1   4.8   8.2  11.8 
1995   2.0  4.6   8.5  12.9   2.1   4.4   8.4  10.7 
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Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98.  Respondents were asked “How many years 
in total have you worked for this employer?” 
Sample:  Full-time employees aged 22-59, except those who reported tenure that exceeded potential experience 
plus two years (about 1.5% of the sample). 
Details:  Means and standard errors are computed from multiple implicates (Rubin 1987), using survey weights.  
Years of potential experience is defined as age minus years of completed education minus six. 
 
 
Table 2:  Expected remaining job tenure 
 Men  Women 
  Average, by years of potential experience 
  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35  0-5 6-15  16-25  26-35 
1983  18.3 21.8 20.2 13.2 15.3 18.3 17.9 11.4 
1989  11.0 18.4 17.8 11.6     8.7 13.2 14.6     9.8 
1992  16.7 18.7 17.5 11.9 13.6 15.8 14.9 10.9 
1995  11.1 17.3 16.3 11.4     8.7 15.4 13.6 10.2 
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Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98.  Respondents were asked “How many years 
do you expect to continue working for this employer?” 
Sample:  Same as in Table 1. 
Details:  Means and standard errors are computed from multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987), using survey 
weights.  Years of potential experience is defined as age minus years of completed education minus six. 
   Approximately 14% of respondents answered that they would “never stop”; we imputed a specific answer for 
them as follows:  (1) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from 
all work; or else (2) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from 
full-time work; or else (3) we assumed that they would work until the age of seventy.   
   In 1995-98,  “less than a year”  was coded as a separate answer, in which case we assigned a value of zero; in 
1983-92 one is the smallest coded response, and for respondents who were coded with a value of one, we randomly 
assigned an answer of zero in the same proportion as is observed among those answering zero or one in 1995-98 
(which will lead to a slight underestimate of the decline in tenure). 
 
  
Table 3:  Job tenure and pension coverage (OLS regression results, SCF) 
  
  Dependent variable:  years of current job tenure 
      
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 8.77) 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
      
Independent  variables:      
      
  has DB pension only  5.49
*** (0.27)  4.24
*** (0.29)  5.47
*** (0.28)  4.44
*** (0.30) 
  has DC pension only  2.54
*** (0.28)  2.25
*** (0.28)  2.55
*** (0.28)  2.31
*** (0.28) 
  has DB & DC pension  5.69
*** (0.35)  5.00
*** (0.34)  5.66
*** (0.35)  5.05
*** (0.35) 
      
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 7.62) 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
Independent  variables:      
      
  has DB pension only  4.07
*** (0.35)  3.45
*** (0.36)  4.08
*** (0.36)  3.56
*** (0.37) 
  has DC pension only  2.25
*** (0.29)  2.10
*** (0.28)  2.21
*** (0.28)  2.09     (0.27) 
  has DB & DC pension  4.38
*** (0.38)  3.85
*** (0.40)  4.43
*** (0.39)  3.96
*** (0.40) 
      
Regression also includes:       
      
   age  yes  yes  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
   year effects  no  no  yes  yes 
   year*job variables  no  no  no  yes 
      
 
Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances 1983, 89, 92, 95, 98. 
Sample:  Full-time employees, excluding those who report tenure in excess of potential experience plus two 
(about 1.5% of the sample); those whose pension type is unknown (approximately 0.5% of the remaining 
sample); and those with earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution. 
Details:  The coefficient estimates and Huber-White standard errors are computed from regressions run on 
multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987).  The regressions were weighted using survey weights.  
* indicates a 
confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.   
   Specifications:  (1) and (5) includes real weekly earnings (in 1998 dollars), age and age squared.  (2) and 
(6) add job variables (4 education, 6 industry, 6 occupation, and 6 firm size dummies, industry* occupation, 
education*occupation, union coverage).  (3) and (7) add year dummies.  (4) and (8) add variables from (2) 
and (3) along with year*industry, year*occupation, year*education, year*union coverage.  
Table 4:  Job tenure and DB pension characteristics (OLS regression results, SCF) 
   
  Dependent variable:  years of current job tenure 
        
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 8.77) 
 (1a)  (4a)  (1b)  (4b) 
         
Independent  variables:      
 
has DB pension only 
       
2.41
*** (0.36)  1.34
*** (0.47)  3.31
*** (0.34)  2.72
*** (0.46) 
has DC pension only  2.69
*** (0.27)  2.48
*** (0.28)  2.64
*** (0.28)  2.36
*** (0.28) 
has DB & DC pension  2.49
*** (0.44)  1.84
*** (0.52)  3.40
*** (0.42)  3.24
*** (0.52) 
      
DB pension benefits at retirement (natural log of real present value, 1998 dollars): 
 Individual-reported    Average 










  log value of lump-sum benefit  0.38
*** (0.13)   0.41
*** (0.12)  0.29
*** (0.13)   0.27
*** (0.12)
  log value of pension wealth  0.54
*** (0.05)   0.52
*** (0.05)  0.43
*** (0.05)   0.41
*** (0.05)
log weekly earnings  1.46
*** (0.27)   2.39
*** (0.28)  1.51
*** (0.27)   2.45
*** (0.28)
      
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 7.62) 
 (5a)  (8a)  (5b)  (8b) 
         
Independent  variables:      
 
has DB pension only 
       
1.24
*   (0.73)  0.63     (0.83)  2.12
*** (0.47)  1.72
*** (0.55) 
has DC pension only  2.39
*** (0.27)  2.29
*** (0.26)  2.35
*** (0.28)  2.21
*** (0.27) 
has DB & DC pension  1.57
*** (0.63)  0.95
     (0.76)  3.47
*** (0.46)  2.10
*** (0.56) 
      
DB pension benefits at retirement (natural log of real present value, 1998 dollars): 
 Individual-reported    Average 
         
  log value of monthly benefit  0.57
*** (0.12)   0.60
*** (0.16)  0.39
*** (0.08)   0.37
*** (0.10)
  log value of lump-sum benefit  0.15     (0.13)   0.19     (0.15)  0.06     (0.12)   0.06     (0.13)
  log value of pension wealth  0.33
*** (0.08)   0.31
*** (0.08)  0.22
*** (0.07)   0.21
*** (0.07)
log weekly earnings  1.86
*** (0.75)   2.59
*** (0.35)  1.94
*** (0.31)   2.65
*** (0.36)
      
Regression also includes:       
         
   age  yes  yes  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
   year effects  no  yes  no  yes 
   year*job variables  no  yes  no  yes 
      
 
Details:  These regressions replicate those appearing in Table 3, with the addition of variables representing DB 
pension benefits expected at retirement  The value was reported in one of three different ways:  (1) over 95% of 
individuals with a DB pension in 1989-98 reported a periodic amount that they expect to receive when they leave 
their job; (2) about 2.5% of individuals with a DB pension in 1989-98 reported a lump-sum amount which they 
expect to receive; (3) the SCF reported expected pension wealth for 55% of individuals with a DB pension in 1983, 
based on information collected from employers.  We included the natural log of the present value of each of these 
variables, along with dummy variables indicating which of the three variables (if any) was reported for a given 
observation.  In regressions (1a), (4a), (5a), and (8a), the self-reported variable is included.  In regressions (1b), 
(4b), (5b), and (8b), the average value is included, imputed on the basis of log earnings, industry, occupation, 
education, unionization, and employer size, separately for men and women. 
   The numbering of the regressions parallels the numbering in Table 3.  Huber-White standard errors appear in 
parentheses; 
* indicates a confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%. 
For additional information, see notes to Table 3.    
Table 5:  Changes in the value of DB pensions (OLS regression results, SCF) 
  
Dependent variable:  expected monthly pension benefit (1998 dollars)
        
  Men  (mean of dependent variable = 1474) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Independent variables:     
     
  year dummy, 1992      -8   (170)    -46    (187) 
  year dummy, 1995  -120   (141)  -226    (158) 
  year dummy, 1998  -174   (164)  -295
*   (172) 
    
  Women  (mean of dependent variable = 944) 
 (3)  (4) 
      
Independent variables:     
     
  has DB pension only  -294
*** (119) -322
*** (138) 
  has DC pension only    -25    (198)    -66    (223) 
  has DB & DC pension  -228
*   (131)  -258
**  (124) 
    
Regression also includes:     
    
   age, tenure, experience  yes  yes 
   job variables  no  yes 
    
 
Data source:  Survey of Consumer Finances 1989, 92, 95, 98. 
Sample:  Full-time employees with DB pensions who report their expected monthly benefit, excluding 
those who report tenure in excess of potential experience plus two (about 1.5% of full-time employees); 
those whose pension type is unknown (approximately 0.5% of the remaining sample); those with earnings 
in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution; those who report that they will receive a lump-sum benefit 
(2.5% of the remaining sample) and those who do not report a benefit (2.5% of the remaining sample). 
Details:  The coefficient estimates and Huber-White standard errors are computed from regressions run on 
multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987).  The regressions were weighted using survey weights.  
* indicates a 
confidence level of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.   
   Specifications:  (1) and (3) includes real weekly earnings (in 1998 dollars), age and age squared, potential 
experience and experience squared, current tenure (linear through quartic terms), and expected future 
tenure (linear through quartic terms).  (2) and (4) add job variables (4 education, 6 industry, 6 occupation, 
and 6 firm size dummies, industry* occupation, education*occupation, union coverage).   
Table 6:  The earnings premium associated with job tenure 
  
  Men 
 1983  1987 1991 1996 1998 2000 
        
Years  of  tenure       
   5   12.9% *** 17.8 *** 16.8 *** 13.6 ***   6.6  *** 11.1 ***
 10  20.4   *** 26.1 *** 24.7 *** 21.7 *** 15.2  *** 16.5 ***
 15  24.4    ** 29.8 *** 29.0  ** 26.6 *** 22.6  *** 20.3 ***
 20    26.3     32.3 
** 32.4   * 30.0   *   27.2  24.3  **
 25    28.0     35.0     35.4     33.4    28.9     27.6 
        
 Women 
        
Years  of  tenure       
   5  18.7 *** 20.6 *** 19.0 *** 20.1 ***   9.8 ***   8.8 ***
 10  25.5 *** 30.6 *** 26.8 *** 28.5 *** 19.8 *** 14.6 ***
 15  29.2 ***    35.2 
* 31.6 *** 33.0 *** 28.4 *** 18.3  **
 20  34.4 ***    37.9  37.3 *** 38.1 ***    34.2     20.9 
 25     41.4     39.9     44.3     45.1     36.1     23.4 
        
 
Data source:  Outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey tenure supplements of January 
1983, 1987, 1991 and February 1996, 1998, and 2000. 
Sample:  Employees aged 21-59 who were working or had a job but were not at work, excluding those who 
report earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution.  The sample size is 32,806 men and 31,124 
women.  
Details:  Each cell in this table reports the estimated effect of years of job tenure on the natural log of the 
real wage, expressed as a percentage increase associated with a given number of years of tenure.  These 
estimates are obtained from regressions run separately on men and women.  The regressions include years 
of job tenure (with nonlinear terms included up to the fourth power), all interacted with the CPS year; years 
of potential experience (up to the fourth power), all interacted with the CPS year; a dummy for being a 
usual full-time worker; dummies for four education categories, all interacted with the CPS year; 51 industry 
dummies, interacted with a dummy for being in the public sector; and 45 occupation dummies, interacted 
with a dummy for being in the public sector.  The real wage is defined as weekly earnings divided by usual 
weekly hours. 
   All of the estimated earnings premia are significantly different from zero.  The asterisks next to each cell 
indicate the significance level on an F-test that compares the earnings premium with the one reported in the 
cell below.  
* indicates a confidence level on the F-statistics of at least 90%, 
** 95%, 
*** 99%.    These tests 
are based on Huber-White standard errors.  Weighted using  the outgoing rotation group weights.   
  
Table 7:  Technological change and long-term jobs  
(OLS regression results, April 1993 CPS) 
  
  Dependent variable (averages, by industry): 
% with a DB pension  Average job tenure  Independent variables 
(averages, by industry):  (1)  (2) (3) (6) (7) (8) 
        












  past changes in computer use:     
















  future changes in computer use:     
    1997-93  -  -  -0.185 
(0.387) 
- -  -0.41 
(6.19) 
        
Independent variables 
(averages over past 10 













      
  TFP growth     -3.41*** 
(1.22) 






  level of investment/10
6   -0.50** 
(0.22) 
-     -6.93* 
  (4.12) 
- 
  capital stock/10
6 -    -0.24** 
(0.10) 
-    -3.46* 
  (2.02) 
        
 
Data source:  Current Population Survey, tenure and compensation data from April 1993; computer use 
data from October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997.  Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, 1958-1996, 
obtained at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html (Jorgenson, Gollop, and 
Fraumeni 1987). 
Sample:  The underlying samples from the CPS consist of workers aged 18-64 who are not self-employed.  
For the computer use data, sample sizes range from 49,601-54,647.  For the April 1993 CPS data, the 
sample is restricted further to those who know their pension status, and the sample size is 12,951.  Both 
data sets are then collapsed by taking averages within each of 50 industries, using the appropriate CPS 
sampling weight. 




*** 99%) from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is defined 
at the top of the column, some of the independent variables are reported in the rows, and the other 
independent variables are log weekly wages and a dummy for whether the employer offers health 
insurance.  Each regression is weighted using  the number of people in the industry in the April 1993 CPS.  
Capital and investment are deflated to 1992 dollars. 
  
Table 8:  Technological change and long-term jobs  
(OLS regression results, multiple CPS tenure supplements) 
  
Dependent variable (averages, by industry): 
Average job tenure 
 
Independent variables 
(averages, by industry):  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        












  past change in  
  computer use 





        
Includes  year  dummies   X  X  X  X 
        
Sample  1983, 87, 91, 96, 98, 00  <1990  >1990 
        
Independent variables 
(averages over past 10 



















        
  TFP growth   9.0 
 (10.9) 
  14.5 
 (11.4) 




  28.9** 
 (16.1) 
  -0.3 
 (16.6) 
  level of investment/10
6   -8.6*** 
  (2.6) 
  -7.4*** 
  (2.7) 
-  -     -4.8 
   (4.7) 
  -9.2*** 
  (3.4) 
  capital stock/10
6 -  -    -4.6*** 
(1.3) 
  -4.0*** 
(1.3) 
- - 
        
Includes  year  dummies   X  X  X  X 
        
Sample  1983, 87, 91, 96  <1990  >1990 
        
 
Data source:  Current Population Survey, tenure and compensation data from January 1983, 1987, and 1991 
and February 1996, 1998, and 2000; computer use data from October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997.  
Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, 1958-1996, obtained at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/ 
faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html (Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni 1987). 
Sample:  The underlying samples from the CPS consist of workers aged 18-64 who are not self-employed.  
For the computer use data, sample sizes range from 49,601-54,647.  For the tenure data, sample sizes range 
from 13,389-56,401.  Both data sets are then collapsed by taking averages within each of 50 industries, 
using the appropriate CPS sampling weight.   




*** 99%) from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is 
average job tenure, some of the independent variables are reported in the rows, and the other independent 
variable is log weekly wages.  Computer use data in a given year are constructed as linear combinations of 
the averages from the computer use supplements immediately preceding and following that year, where the 
weights depend on the number of years.  Each regression is weighted using  the number of people in the 
industry in that year.  Capital and investment are deflated to 1992 dollars. 
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